The use of military force to secure political and diplomatic objectives has been commonplace throughout history, but gunboat diplomacy is used to refer to how European countries and the United States used threats of naval force to bully weaker countries into granting them concessions. While gunboat diplomacy was a major facet of the “Age of Imperialism” that characterized the international order before the world wars, there are more recent examples in the 20th century.
What Is Gunboat Diplomacy?
In October 2001, the Daily Telegraph wrote an obituary about the seminal British thinker and diplomat James Cable, describing him as “one of the most influential naval strategic thinkers of the last half-century.” Born in 1920, Cable was a veteran of military service during the Second World War, the UK ambassador to Finland, and a lifelong diplomat in the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office. Cable wrote nine books on the use of military power in supporting diplomatic objectives. Two of his books became famous for their discussions about the power of gunboat diplomacy.
In his writing on the topic, Cable defined gunboat diplomacy as “the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as an act of war, in order to secure advantage or to avert loss, either in furtherance of an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the jurisdiction of their own state.” He broke down the topic into four subcategories: definitive, expressive, catalytic, and purposeful. While all four types of gunboat diplomacy differed in their approaches, they all had the same outcome: achieving one’s objectives through the military threat.
Cable’s writing was not unique; other analysts had written about the concept of using force to gain what they wanted. However, his work created a bedrock of research for other scholars to emulate. He also argued that the practice did not end after the 19th century, but continued to be used at the time he wrote his books. His analysis was the most thorough of any scholar who researched the topic.
The Pacifico Affair
One prominent case study of gunboat diplomacy was the Pacifico Affair in 1850. In April 1847, the prominent British businessman James Mayer de Rothschild visited Athens, Greece to negotiate a loan with the Greek government. The annual burning in effigy of Judas Iscariot was canceled because the Greek government thought it would offend Rothschild. Many local Greeks were enraged and blamed Don David Pacifico, a former Portuguese diplomat and British citizen. A crowd rioted outside his home and broke in to seize his belongings.
The British government was angered by the attack on one of its citizens. Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston, who would later serve two terms as prime minister, asked that Pacifico compile a list of the property stolen from him. Palmerston had supported Greek independence, but he insisted that the Greeks compensate Pacifico. Over 16 months elapsed before Pacifico complained to the British government that the Greeks had not helped him. As a result, the British were resolved to act and Palmerston asked the Royal Navy to blockade Athens and, if necessary, seize Greece’s fleet.
From January to March 1850, the British Royal Navy blockaded Athens and seized several Greek ships. This caused a dispute with France and Russia, who were also backers of Greece. However, King Otto relented and agreed to compensate Pacifico for the property seized from him with 120,000 drachmas. Despite backlash in London, Palmerston successfully showed that British naval power was capable of gaining concessions without even needing to use force, simply because of its power and reputation.
The Second American-Barbary War
Although the US Navy was still in its infancy, the United States practised gunboat diplomacy soon after gaining independence. At the start of the 19th century, several US naval squadrons went to the North African coastline to protect American ships from being seized by vessels of the North African kingdoms. The Tripolitans engaged in serious hostilities with the Americans before being forced to sign a treaty promising to stop attacking American ships. However, the Algerians continued to attack American ships because the United States was distracted by the War of 1812.
In February 1815, President James Madison asked Congress for funds to send a squadron to force Algiers to stop seizing American ships and sailors. Commodores Stephen Decatur and William Bainbridge took two separate flotillas to blockade Algiers and force Dey Omar Agha to sign a treaty. Several Algerian ships were taken by force and the US Navy blockaded Algiers in June 1815. Realizing that his forces were outmatched, Agha agreed to sign a peace treaty with the United States that involved releasing seized American ships and sailors.
The Americans did not need to actually seize control of Algiers to gain what they wanted. Even though Agha continued to seize foreign ships, he did not attack American vessels going forward. American policymakers learned from this that naval power was essential to the country’s ability to grow on the international stage. To this day, the United States has a fleet stationed in the Mediterranean to promote its interests, a legacy of its longstanding commitment to the region.
Independence of Panama
A major reason Panama has independence today is because the United States used gunboat diplomacy to force Colombia to recognize Panamanian sovereignty. President Theodore Roosevelt was a major supporter of the practice of using force to expand America’s global reach. For several decades, the US government envisaged building a canal in Central America to connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Roosevelt intended for the canal to run through the Panamanian isthmus, then controlled by Colombia. Because Colombia’s government, led by José Manuel Marroquín, refused to support American ownership of the canal, Roosevelt vowed to support Panamanian secession in the hope that a new government would grant him his wish.
In October 1903, the US Navy sent ships to steam off Panama’s coast and landed Marines to seize the railroad line. They landed more forces in November to deter any Colombian response. On November 4, Panamanian rebels declared independence from Colombia. The US recognized Panamanian independence immediately and worked on a treaty with the new government led by Dr. Manuel Amador Guerrero.
On November 18, 1903, the US and Panamanian governments signed the Panama Canal Treaty ensuring that the US would protect Panama from Colombia in exchange for control of the Canal Zone. Colombia had no choice but to recognize Panama’s independence because it was too weak to stand up to the United States. Without any major battles, the United States supported the secession of a territory from a sovereign nation for political and economic gains, a case of what Cable called “purposeful force.”
The Danzig Crisis in 1932
The period leading up to WWII saw new powers in Central and Eastern Europe attempt to use force to gain concessions from their neighbors. One major issue bedeviling the Polish government was how to resolve the issue of control over Danzig. After Poland gained independence, the city of Danzig (Gdánsk) was designated a Free City supervised by the League of Nations. While Poland agreed to respect the city’s autonomy, it insisted on representing Danzig at the League of Nations and being allowed to station warships in the city harbor.
In March 1931, Danzig’s Senate stripped Poland of the right to dock warships in the city’s harbor. This was in part due to pressure from Germany, which opposed any more Polish control over the city and its environs. Fearing that Poland would be cornered on this issue at the Lausanne Conference, Józef Piłsudski, the de facto Polish leader, decided to order the destroyer ORP Wicher to sail to the harbor at the same time some British warships were visiting. He hoped to force Danzig to accept terms favorable to Warsaw.
On June 15, 1932, the Wicher arrived at Danzig alongside several British vessels and docked in the port. Apart from some protests, no one harassed the crew. After a couple of days, the Polish and British ships departed. Foreign Minister August Zaleski pleaded Poland’s case and managed to secure terms for a new treaty ensuring Poland had a right to dock ships in Danzig’s harbor. It was the only time Poland engaged in gunboat diplomacy in its history.
Operation Vantage
Even as Britain’s empire eroded after WWII, London hoped to maintain as much influence as possible on the international stage. It propped up several friendly Middle Eastern governments, especially the Kingdom of Kuwait. There was a fear that Pan-Arab governments like Iraq and Egypt posed a threat to the UK’s allies in the region. In 1958, when General Abdul-Karim Qasim seized power in Baghdad, Western policymakers became very concerned about Jordan and Kuwait’s stability.
Prime Minister Qasim was not a Pan-Arabist, nor did he desire a conflict with the West. However, he shared many Iraqi nationalists’ views on Kuwait being a fake country that should be incorporated into Iraq. Kuwait had declared independence in June 1961, something that officials in Baghdad opposed. Qasim ordered Iraqi forces to the border of the new state and declared Kuwait to be a part of Iraq. He was opposed by the Arab League, which pledged to support Kuwait’s emir, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salim Al-Sabah. Al-Sabah also requested assistance from UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan. Thousands of Saudi and British troops arrived in Kuwait, backed up by the Royal Navy.
Qasim backed off and was subsequently overthrown in a coup in 1963. By moving ground and naval forces to Kuwait, Britain successfully engaged in what Cable called catalytic force, or the use of military power to buy actors time to resolve a problem. Kuwait faced more trouble from Iraq in 1991 but was saved again by the Arab League and Western powers.
