The question of free will has been among the most important quests in the history of philosophy. Undoubtedly, the question has grave implications for our understanding of ethics and law, but most importantly, it touches on a universal theme that concerns us collectively. Following the findings of prominent philosophers and neurologists, we can gain a better understanding of our experience of free will.
Free Will and Determinism
Determinism is the philosophical perspective that everything in the universe, including human action, is determined by preceding influences or causes. The argument of causal determinism can be briefly summarized as follows: since the universe is governed by the law of cause and effect, and human beings are part of the universe, then human beings are determined by the law of cause and effect.
While some philosophers argue that free will is compatible with determinism, many consider it a logical impossibility within this framework. However, as with any theory, understanding determinism differs from one philosophical system to another. Certain views on determinism are extremely nuanced and complex as philosophers attempt to formulate it in the larger context of their theoretical frameworks, such as in the case of Baruch Spinoza’s conception of determinism.
The Illusion of Free Will
Get the latest articles delivered to your inbox
Sign up to our Free Weekly NewsletterLike Spinoza, Arthur Schopenhauer, the prominent 19th-century German philosopher, is renowned for his nuanced understanding of determinism. He is famous for claiming that “a man can do as he will, but not will as he will” – a statement Albert Einstein later quoted in The World As I See It. Schopenhauer’s short statement goes to the heart of a paradox often encountered in discussions of determinism, which is: If I don’t have free will, how come I experience agency? While we can decide to act upon our will, we cannot determine the will upon which we act. So while we are free to act, we are not free to will. Incidentally, this mirrors recent findings in neuroscience.
Evidence in Neurophilosophy
Benjamin Libet was famous for conducting the first successful experiment in neuroscience that has implications for our understanding of free will. By observing his subjects on an EEG, Libet proved that unconscious brain activities initiate action before his subjects were consciously aware of their volition to make the action in question. Libet concluded that free will is illusive since our conscious volition doesn’t instigate our acts. We only belatedly become aware of an action already determined unconsciously.
While many scientists critiqued Libet’s experiment, further research, such as the experiment conducted by Masao Matsuhashi and Mark Hallet in 2008, proved that while the specific time interval between brain activity (readiness potential) and conscious volition may vary from Libet’s initial findings, the former precedes the latter in all cases. The implications of these studies on the philosophical study of free will are that they resolve the apparent paradox between our experience of volition and determinism. As philosopher and neuroscientist Adina L. Roskies concludes, “We feel we choose, but we don’t” (Roskies, 2021).
The ‘Free Won’t’
It’s unsettling to think that our decisions in life don’t come from our conscious volition and to feel that we have such little control over our actions – a realization that could easily make us fall into a sense of meaninglessness and disappointment were we to accept determinism. However, although his experiment proved that our experience of free will is illusive, Libet believed in what he called ‘the free won’t’. The ‘free won’t’ is our power to veto our impulses for action before they materialize. Libet found that although acts are predetermined by unconscious brain activities, we have the power to either consent or veto their actualization if we pay sufficient attention to the impulses that we experience.
Going back to Schopenhauer, although we cannot determine our will, we can determine our acts. We may not have control over what we will, but we are free to act or not to act upon it. So perhaps it is okay if free will is an illusion after all, since we preserve our power to veto.
