On September 11, 1973, Chile entered a new era. On this day, Augusto Pinochet took power and began a reign that would be characterized by brutal anti-communist sentiment and consolidation of right-wing principles. One of many instances of illegal interference in foreign governments, the coup in Chile was supported and organized in no small part by the CIA, which developed a reputation for propping up dictatorships in South America and beyond. The extent and impact of US involvement is a subject of academic debate and harsh criticism today.
Before Pinochet: The US in Chile
Long before the 1973 coup in which Augusto Pinochet took power and ousted the democratically elected left-wing Salvador Allende, the United States had already established deep roots in Chile’s economic system. US involvement in Chile’s economy and interest in its government dates back to the beginning of the 19th century.
As far back as 1811, the US was investing in Chilean governance. Under President James Madison, the US sent an agent to Chile to assess the power of the revolutionaries against Spanish control in Chile.
Nine decades later, the US supported and assisted the efforts of President José Manuel Balmaceda during the Chilean Civil War. During the war, multiple incidents occurred between Americans and Chileans that were cause for concern. The US seized arms shipments bound for Congressional forces fighting against Balmaceda, and American sailors were attacked in Valparaiso as a response.
The diplomatic incident almost led to a war, but the situation was cooled down by US Secretary of State James G. Blaine. Balmaceda’s eventual defeat and suicide meant the end of the Liberal Republic and the commencement of the Parliamentary Era.
After the First World War, the United States intensified its interventionist policy in Chile. As global power shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States, the latter found itself with greater power to influence world affairs in its favor.
Salvador Allende and Cold War Politics in Chile
During the 1950s and 1960s, considerable effort was poured into guiding Chile’s political dynamic. The main goal of these efforts was preventing Salvador Allende of the Frente de Acción Popular, Popular Action Front, and later the Popular Unity Alliance, from taking power. He had been described as a democratic socialist and a Marxist, and his policies were significantly to the left of the political spectrum.
From 1958 to 1964, under the presidential leadership of Jorge Alessandri and his right-wing policies, Chile was a welcoming place for US businesses, and US economic interests found firm footing in the country. He dealt with Chile’s runaway inflation by instituting austerity measures. He saw some success in stabilizing the economy, but a series of earthquakes during his tenure made relief efforts and rebuilding a primary concern, and there was little money to deal with other pressing issues. His hesitancy in dealing with agrarian reform, unemployment, and housing lost him the support of many sectors of Chilean society, which migrated to the left of the political spectrum.
Alessandri stood against Allende in the crucial 1970 election that would push US efforts into overdrive. What happened at this time is retold in detail in declassified CIA documents, which have been a source of criticism and debate by many academics.
The director of the Chilean Documentation Project of the National Security Archive, Peter Kornbluh, is one of those who led the charge in getting documents regarding US relations with Chile declassified. His work in the field was instrumental in bringing to light the depth of US involvement in regime change in the 1960s, and the propping up of the Pinochet government in the 1970s.
In September 1970, Chile held elections and voted the left-wing Salvador Allende into power. The US was fearful that if Allende were successful with his policies, other Latin American countries would follow suit and shift towards socialism.
Kornbluh states that US plans to intervene began a day after the election, several weeks before Allende was even inaugurated. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Richard Nixon headed the efforts to ensure that Allende’s government failed.
The US began an invisible economic blockade of Chile, paired with efforts to influence the military, and funneled money to the parts of Chile’s media that opposed Allende and socialism.
According to a CIA report, in the period between 1970 and the 1973 coup that would topple Allende, the CIA spent a total of 8 million dollars (between 55 and 59 million USD today) in its effort to effect regime change. This money was funneled into supporting Allende’s enemies and funding assets for intelligence gathering.
After Allende was elected, he began a program of nationalization that would further provoke US desires to have him removed. Foreign companies that were engaged in “excessive profit-making” were targeted. While many companies were compensated based on a percentage of the market value, US-owned mines were given very little for the transfer of ownership.
The reforms were initially successful and wages increased, but this only created a rise in consumerism, and Chile could not meet the demand. This dynamic was perfect for CIA meddling, and by courting the Chilean military, the CIA helped guide the country toward a military coup.
The CIA’s Plans for Regime Change: “Track 1”
The United States pursued two main plans to oust Allende after he had won the presidential election but before he could be inaugurated. The 1970 election had been a three-way contest, with Allende narrowly winning the largest percentage. The content was then sent to the Chilean Congress, which would vote between the top two candidates.
“Track 1” involved Eduardo Frei, the president of the centrist Christian Democratic Party who had been president of Chile since 1964. This plan called for Frei to support and confirm Jorge Alessandri as president, after which Alessandri was to resign and leave Frei to run against Allende in new elections. The US planned to buy the votes of Chilean senators to block Allende from being inaugurated.
In the event that this plan failed, US Ambassador Edward Korry was to convince Frei to attempt a constitutional coup. The final measure of the plan, if all the preceding attempts failed, was to garner international media attention that would doom Allende’s government by imposing economic measures that would reduce Chile’s people to poverty and force Allende to adopt policies that would turn Chile into a police state. Thus, the US would be able to justify their condemnation of Allende.
Winning Over the Military: “Track 2”
The second plan, “Track 2,” would focus on the Chilean military and foment support for a military coup. A significant obstacle in this approach was removing the chief commander of the Chilean Army, General René Schneider, from power. Schneider was a constitutionalist who would not support any attempt at a military coup.
The CIA funded and organized an attempted kidnapping of Schneider. The plan had called for Schneider to be kidnapped and flown to Argentina. Schneider would then be replaced with a coup supporter, and the kidnapping would be blamed on Allende’s supporters. None of this, however, came to fruition, as the first step in the plan was botched. During the kidnapping attempt, Schneider resisted and was fatally shot.
This tragic turn of events upended US plans; the Chilean people, shocked at the murder, rallied in support of constitutionalism and Allende. Nothing could stop his accession to the presidency. The Chilean Congress voted to inaugurate Allende on October 24, 1970.
From this point on, having failed to prevent Allende’s presidency, the United States worked to undermine it. One of Kissinger’s main concerns was that having a Marxist freely elected by democratic means would set a dangerous precedent for neighboring countries to follow suit.
Fomenting Discontent: Undermining Allende’s Presidency
At the end of 1970, Kissinger drew up the Covert Action Program to target Allende’s presidency. From an internal position, Chile was already divided. Having only narrowly become president, Allende was already on shaky ground.
Both the far left and the far right mobilized under this dynamic. For the United States, Chile was fertile ground for further interference. Under the Covert Action Plan, the United States divided Allende’s supporters, continued to look for anti-Allende opportunities in the military, supported and funded non-communist entities in Chile, helped the Chilean media run anti-Allende campaigns, and engaged in slander against Allende, accusing him of being undemocratic.
Coup: September 11, 1973
While the events of September 11, 1973 are generally clear, there is debate as to the extent of CIA involvement. While the CIA maintains it did not take direct part in the coup, the academic assessments of authors such as Peter Kornbluh, Tim Weiner, and Peter Winn agree that the support that the CIA gave to Allende’s opponents laid the groundwork for a coup as well as the Pinochet regime thereafter.
The CIA was well aware that plans were afoot to oust Allende, and even if it did not physically participate, it offered a great deal of support to those who were going to carry it out. Kissinger told Nixon, “We didn’t do it. I mean we helped them. [Word missing] created the conditions as great as possible.”
On September 11, 1973, the military launched a coup. The presidential palace was surrounded, and Allende purportedly committed suicide rather than be taken into custody. In his place, General Augusto Pinochet, the army chief that Allende had mistakenly trusted as a loyal asset, took power and began a brutal rule that lasted 17 years.
The Pinochet Regime
Pinochet’s rule was characterized by the murder and forced disappearance of thousands of people thought to harbor communist ideals. Crackdowns on left-leaning elements of society were commonplace, and torture camps engaged in horrific practices.
While the United States was predisposed to the junta that had taken power and supplied it with material support, it openly criticized the dictatorship in an attempt to ensure the American public did not associate the US government with support for a brutal dictatorship.
Efforts, however, were useless in the face of thousands of refugees and exiles who came with their stories of what was happening in Chile. By the mid-1970s, the truth was out, and the American public was aware that their government had aided in a coup to oust a democratically elected leader and then supported a dictator known to be engaging in human rights abuses.
The American people were already incensed by the mounting losses in Vietnam, and attempts by the US government to curtail communism in Chile proved to be widely unpopular. Not only were there efforts from the populace to end US support for Pinochet, but many members of Congress took action.
Senator Ted Kennedy introduced amendments to cut off military aid to Chile, from financing to the sale of weapons to the Pinochet regime. As Congress saw significant success in the 1970s in forcing the US government to end aid to Pinochet, they also initiated the creation of the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the State Department to assess countries’ actions across the world regarding human rights violations. This Bureau, championed by Jimmy Carter, condemned the Chilean regime and added its voice to hundreds of thousands of exiled Chileans around the world, drumming up support against Pinochet.
Aftermath: A Turning Point for US-Latin America Relations?
After the Washington D.C. assassination of a former ambassador in Allende’s government, Orlando Letelier, by a car bomb, the strained relations between Pinochet’s regime and the US government hit a new low. The US began to accept that it had to push for democratic reform in Chile. Not even the conservative Reagan era granted a reprieve for Pinochet.
This represented a complete u-turn in US governmental attitudes towards Chile as it now had to deal with the consequences of its own actions. To this day, the United States government and the CIA continue to face criticism for decades of meddling in Latin American politics.
